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WHO SPEAKS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT?
INTRODUCTION

In the current turmoil of environmental litigation, there are few
areas so much in ferment as that known as standing. 1 This concept involves the ability, if not the right, of a person to be heard in a court
of law:
The gist of the question of standing is whether the litigant has
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
questions.
The importance of standing is of no small moment:
The first, and perhaps the greatest hurdle in a suit with the federal
government is the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Because
the government puts so much of its litigation effort into such motions, he who defeats one may consider himself to have won a major
victory. In fact, establishing the right of the citizen to sue to protect the environment by defeating such motions is of the first priority. Precedents in the field are to be sought after.'
The change in the law is so rapid, however, that while this statement
was made barely more than a year ago it is already dated. While the
problems of standing have not been entirely eliminated, 4 this note will
demonstrate that the direction is clear;' that the right of the citizen to
challenge actions of the federal government in order to protect an environment has gained an established position; and that feasible means
exist to provide standing to citizens to challenge action of other citizens on behalf of the public interest in the environment.

'Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?,
78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969): "Confusion

twice confounded reigns in the area of federal

jurisdiction described as standing to sue."; Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing,
37 UNrv. OF CHI. L. REv. 450 (1970); Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75
YAtE L.J. 1227 (1966).

'Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

'Note, Project Rulison Brief, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 761 (1970) quoting James W.
Moorman, Outline for the Practicing Environmental Lawyer, presented to the Conference on Law and Environment, September 11-12, 1969, Warrenton, Virginia.
'In addition to those discussed infra, the Environmental Law Digest, (August/
September, 1970) lists the following pending cases in which standing is contested:
Alpine Lakes Protection Society v. Hardin (W.D. Wash.); Association of Northwest
Steelheaders v. Corps of Engineers (W.D. Wash.); Environmental Defense Fund v.
Corps of Engineers (D.C. Cir.); Gandt v. Hardin (W.D. Mich.); Ottinger v. Penn
Central (S.D. N.Y.); Schiller v. Muskegon (W.D. Mich.); Sierra Club v. Hardin
(D. Alaska); Souicie v. Volpe (D.C. Cir.); Steward v. Resor (E.D. Pa.); Stock
v. Ronan (N.Y. Sup. Ct.); Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. U.S. (W.D.
Tex.).
'The trend is well documented: Davis, supra note 1; Reich, supra note 1; Davis,
Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 UNIV. OF CHI. L. REV. 601 (1968); Jaffe, The
Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff,
116 UNiv. or PENN. L. REV. 1033; Sax, Public Rights in Public Resources; The
Citizens Role in Conservation and Development, in CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN
WATER LAW (Johnson and Lewis, eds. 1970); Comment, Administrative and Judicial
Remedies Relating to the Use and Disposition of the Public Land Administered by
the Department of the Interior, 38 UNIV. OF COLO. L. REV. 391 (1966); Note, Equity
and the Eco-System: Can Injunctions Clear the Air?, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1254 (1970).
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Causes for confusion in the law of standing have drawn much comment.' It is outside the scope of this note to re-examine those forces. This
note will be limited to an examination of requirements for representation of the public interest in environmental litigation in two areas: standing to bring suit for judicial review, and standing to challenge the actions of private citizens on behalf of the public. The first, judicial review, finds focus on cases involving the federal government, and the
second, on an enabling statute for the states to allow citizen challenge
of private conduct that is adverse to the public interest in the environment.
Standing is generally recognized as but one aspect of justiciabilityT
It goes to the qualifications of the plaintiff to bring the suit, and not to
the sufficiency of the issues in dispute.8 It also requires injury suffered
by the plaintiffs and some nexus between the status of the plaintiff and
the conduct challenged. 10
The last two requirements are most frequently at issue, and are not
easily separated in public interest suits. Injury is not confined to economic injury, but has been held to include injury to aesthetic, conservational, and recreational interests. 1 In cases of judicial review, the injury and the required nexus have been satisfied by a showing of "person aggrieved" and "adversely affected" by decisions of administrative
agencies. 12 The injury required under this statute has also been described

OU.S. ex rel Chapman v. Federal Power Commission, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953). In
addition to the problems inherent in the concept itself, two others should be noted:
Inadequately developed legal theories and poorly prepared factual cases discussed in
Note, Equity and the Eco-System: Can Injunctions Clear the Air?, supra note 5;
Reich, supra note 1; Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75
HARv. L. REV. 255 (1961); Note, The Conservationists and the Public Lands, 68
7MIcH. L. REV. 1200 (1970).
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98 (1968); Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Misuse
of Standing, 14 STAN. L. REV.433 (1962).
'Flast v. Cohen, supra note 7 at 99: "'.. . when standing is placed in issue in a case,
the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to
request an adjudication of a particular issue, and not whether the issue itself is
justiciable.' '
QId. at 101; Scanwell Laboratory v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 872, (D.C. Cir. 1970).
0
' Flast v. Cohen, supra note 7 at 102; Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Reviews
Private Actions, supra note 6; Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, supra note 5.
For a clear discussion of the distinctions involved see the dissent to Barlow v. Collins,
397 U.S. 159, 168 (1970); and Association of Data Processing Service Organizations
(A.D.P.) v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 168 (1970).
UScenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission (F.P.C.), 354
F.2d 609, 615 (2nd Cir. 1965); Environmental Defense Fund (E.D.F.) v. Hardin,
428 F.2d 1093, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Road Review League, Town of Bedford v.
Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650, 660 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).
1E.D.F. v. Hardin, supra note 11 at 1097: "Like other consumers, those who consume
-however unwittingly-the pesticide residues permitted by the Secretary [Secretary
of Agriculture] to accumulate in the environment are 'persons aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute.' " The footnote to this language
states: "That is the test of standing conferred by the A.P.A. [Administrative Procedures Act] 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V. 1969). It is equivalent to the requirement
that the complainants interests fall within the zone of interest sought to be protected
by the statute." The note cites Barlow v. Collins, supra note 10 and A.D.P. v. Camp,
supra note 7; Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 138 (1967). See note 38
infra for text of 5 U.S.C. § 702.
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as an invasion of a "legal interest," as a "legally protected interest,"
and as a "legal wrong."' 8 And this language can also be descriptive of
the required nexus.
Where the plaintiff sues as a representative of the public interest in
an environment, the injury to the plaintiff need not be greater than that
to the public generally.' 4 And in certain situations a plaintiff will be
granted standing not because of the injury to himself that he alleges,
but because of his capacity to represent those whose rights he asserts, and
the recognized nexus between the rights asserted and the conduct challenged. This occurs where plaintiff radio stations challenge Federal Communication Commission (F.C.C.) licensing decisions; 1" where competitors are allowed to represent the public; 16 where a plaintiff asserts the

1Perkins v. Lukens, 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940); Harrison-Halsted Community Group
v. Housing and Home Finance Agency, 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962) denied standing
to a group of homeowners protesting an urban renewal project on the ground that
the plaintiffs had no legal right that had been invaded. Dicta in Scanwell Laboratory
v. Thomas, supra note 9 at 472 presents a detailed argument that the legal interest
test should be rejected in favor of a single test, "injury in fact." Accord, dissent
to Barlow v. Collins, supra note 10 at 168.
"E.D.F. v. Hardin, supra note 11 at 1096. This action was brought against the Secretary of Agriculture by five conservation organizations to suspend and cancel registration of D.D.T. The court, under 7 U.S.C. § 135 (d) (1964) granting the right
of review to ''any persons who will be adversely affected by an order'' granted
standing: "The zone of interests sought to be protected by the statute included not
only the economic interest of the registrant but also the public interest in safety.
Thus petitioners have standing if they allege sufficient injury in fact to create a
constitutionally justiciable issue.'' At 1097: ''Consumers of regulated products and
services have standing to protect the public interest in the proper consideration of a
regulatory system enacted for their benefit," and "The consumers interest in environmental protection may properly be represented by a membership organization
with a national interest in the problem."
15Standing under the Federal Communication Act has its own history: In Commission
v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) the plaintiff was granted standing
even though he had "no right" as an injured competitor, but only that of protecting the public. In Scripps Howard Radio v. F.C.C., 316 U.S. 4 (1942) the plaintiff
was granted standing as an aggrieved person only as a representative of the public.
And in Office of Communication of the Church of Christ v. F.C.C. (Federal Communication Commission), 359 F.2d 994, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1966) Warren E. Burger, J:
"Since the concept of standing is a practical and functional one designed to insure
that only those with a genuine and legitimate interest can participate in a proceeding,
we can see no reason to exclude those with such an obvious and acute concern as
the listening audience," granting a competing radio station standing as the representative of the listening audience.
"Consumer representatives, too, have recognized standing: Associated Industries of
New York v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 vacated as moot 320 U.S. 707 (1943): "While
Congress can constitutionally authorize no one in the absence of an actual justiciable
controversy, to bring a suit for the judicial determination either of the constitutionality of a statute or the scope of powers conferred by a statute upon a government
officer, it can constitutionally authorize one of its own officials, such as the Attorney
General, to bring a proceeding to prevent another official from acting in violation
of his statutory powers; for then an actual controversy exists, and the Attorney
General can properly be vested with authority, in such a controversy, to vindicate
the interest of the public or the government. Instead of designating the Attorney
General, or some other public officer, to bring such proceedings, the Congress can
constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any non-official person, or on a designated group of non-official persons, authority to bring a suit to prevent action by an
officer in violation of his statutory powers; for then, in like manner, there is an
actual controversy, and there is nothing constitutionally prohibiting Congress from
empowering any person, official or not, to institute a proceeding involving such a
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rights of others under the First Amendment to the Constitution ;17 and
where unique fact situations are controlling.18
The United States Supreme Court had long denied the right of a
person suing as a federal taxpayer to challenge federal expenditures.?
That rule was changed in 1968, when the court granted standing to a
taxpayer, as taxpayer, to challenge allegedly unconstitutional expenditures under the First Amendment. 20 The court required that the plaintiff challenge a specific constitutional provision, and that he demonstrate
a nexus between his status as an injured taxpayer and the allegedly unconstitutional expenditure. 2 1 That was a significant step toward allowing
a citizen to sue, but it can best be perceived as a step in judicial evolution
that began in England where "even a stranger" was allowed to challenge governmental conduct. 2 2 The development in the United States first
recognized a taxpayer's right to challenge municipal expenditures 23 and
then to challenge state expenditures.2 4 Both had been upheld by the Supreme Court, 25 providing ground upon which this next step was takento allow a taxpayer to challenge federal expenditures. Further, the Supreme Court had long recognized the concept of the public interest as providing basis for standing, 26 and had made early suggestions as to the

controversy, even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such persons,
Accord, Read v. Ewing,
so authorized, are so to speak, private Attorney Generals."
205 F.2d 630, 631 (2nd Cir. 1953); Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities, 390 U.S. 1 (1968);
E.D.F. v. Hardin, supra note 11 at 1097.
17Sedler,
Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962) ; Abington School Dist. v. Sehempp 374 U.S. 203 (1963) ; Allen v. State Board of Electors,
393 U.S. 544 (1969); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). Contra,
Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
"5A miscellaneous category is necessary: Gonzales v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C.
Cir. 1964). Plaintiff challenged his disbarment from bidding on government contracts. The court, in an opinion by Warren E. Burger, J. held that the plaintiff
had no right to bid, but nevertheless had standing to contest his disbarment; Jenkins
v.McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969). Standing was granted without a showing of
injury or even immediate threat to the plaintiff, but only to those subject to action
by a state investigative commission; Superior Oil v. Udall, 409 F.2d 1115 (D.C.
Cir. 1969). Standing was granted without discussion to a second low bidder to
challenge a federal contract award to the low bidder; Scanwell Laboratory v. Thomas,
supra note 9. The second low bidder was granted standing as a party aggrieved
under the Administrative Procedures Act to challenge the contract award to the
lowest bidder.
"Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
20Flast v. Cohen, supra note 7.
"1Id.at 102.
"Berger, supra note 1.
2'Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1265
(1961) identified 40 states, including Montana, that allow suits against municipalities;
Comment, Taxpayer's Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895 (1960)
identified 34 states, including Montana, which allow taxpayers suits against municipal
action; Comment, Standing to Sue and Conservation Values, supra, note 5.
nJaffe, supra note 5; Jaffe, id. identified 27 states that allow suit against the state,
and ''another 9 or more where it may be true."
25
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cochrane v. Louisiana State Bd.
of Edue., 281 U.S. 370 (1930); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Crampton v.
Zabrieski, 101 U.S. 601 (1879).
"Associated Industries v. Ickes, supra note 16; Office of Communication of United
Church of Christ v. F.C.C., supra note 15 at 1002.
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requirements of a plaintiff who could represent that interest. Two bases
then are supplied: a taxpayer can sue, and there is a representable public
interest. The process that followed is a melding of the two to provide
citizen representation to protect an environment.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Standing to challenge governmental action in order to protect an
environment based on non-economic adverse impact on the public interest
is now granted, if not routinely, at least often enough to provide material
for analysis. A few cases stand out:
In 1965, a group of New York citizens, organized as the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, joined with three Hudson River towns
(Cortlandt, Putnam Valley, and Yorktown) to challenge the decision of
the Federal Power Commission (F.P.C.) to grant a license to Consolidated Edison Company to construct a pumped-storage project atop Storm
King Mountain, on the west side of the Hudson River.2 7 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals granted standing:
Although a "case" or "controversy" which is otherwise lacking
cannot be created by statute, a statute may create new interests or
rights and thus give standing to one who would be barred by the
lack of "case" or "controversy." The case or controversy requirement of Article III §2 of the Constitution does 'not require that an
aggrieved or adversely affected party have a personal economic interest.'

The petitioners sued under the Federal Power Act (F.P.A.). 29 The
court held that the Act created enforceable rights in a person adversely
affected or aggrieved ;30 that adversely affected or aggrieved did not require personal injury to the plaintiff, but only injury to the public at
large ;31 and that the injury to the public need not be economic, but
32
could be recreational, aesthetic, or conservational.
The petitioners were successful in their challenge: the court directed the F.P.C. to take into consideration environmental concerns in
3
their licensing deliberations .
"Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F.P.C., supra note 11.
'id. at 615.
29FEDERAL PowFa ACT, 16 U.S.C. § 825 (1) (b). "Any party to a proceeding under
this chapter aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may
obtain a review of such order in the United States court of appeals for any circuit
wherein the licensee of public utility to which the order relates is located or has its
principal place of business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, by filing in such court, within sixty days after the order of the Commission upon the application for rehearing, a written petition praying that the order
of the Commission be modified or set aside in whole or in part . . .''
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F.P.C., supra note 11 at 616.
'Id.; Powelton Civic Home Owners v. H.U.D. (Department of Housing and Urban
Development), 284 F. Supp. 809, 826 (1968). "The import of the Scenic Hudson case
is that neither economic injury nor a specific individual legal right are necessary
adjuncts to standing.''
2Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F.P.C., supra note 11 at 615.
8id. at 624. It must be noted that a court order against the agency action was not
obtained: all that was gained was that the agency must consider non-economie
environmental interests in making their determinations.
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A second step was taken in a suit initiated by the Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley, the Sierra Club, and the Village of Tarreytown,
New York. 4 The Corps of Engineers had begun construction of a dike
and causeway to run along the Hudson for several miles, claiming authority to do so had been delegated by Congress. 5 The plaintiffs argued
that the delegation of authority omitted "dike" construction and so required Congressional approval. 36
In its consideration of standing for the Sierra Club, the court (the
Second Circuit again) declared:
We hold, therefore, that the public interest in environmental resources-an interest created by statutes affecting the issuance of
this permit is a legally protected interest, affording these plaintiffs, as responsible representatives of the public, standing to obtain judicial review of agency action alleged to be in contravention
of that public interest.'
Standing for review in this case rested solely upon Section 10 of the
Administrative Procedures Act (A.P.A.). a The Rivers and Harbors Act
does not provide for judicial review as does the F.P.A. Nonetheless, federal court jurisdiction to review agency actions, under this holding, is
based on the A.P.A.3 9 A plaintiff meeting the requirements of the A.P.A.
will require no additional statutory aid to obtain judicial review in federal court. Summing up, the court holds:
The rule, therefore, is that if the statues involved in the controversy are concerned with the protection of natural, historic, and
scenic resources, then a congressional intent exists to give standing
to groups interested in these factors and who allege that these factors are not being properly considered by the agency."
A third dimension was added in 1967 when the Road Review League,
Town of Bedford, New Jersey, a local civic organization and two wildlife sanctuaries 41 brought suit under Section 10 of the A.P.A.42 and the
Federal Highway Act 43 to challenge the proposed location of a highway.44 The court granted standing: "My decision here can be thought to
involve an extension of the Scenic Hudson doctrine. If so it is an extension which I believe to be warranted by the rationale of that decision."4N
The extension? The plaintiffs in Scenic Hudson had appealed as parties
to an administrative proceeding and were returned to that agency for

'Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe,

425 F.2d 97 (2nd Cir. 1970).
15THE RIvERs AND HARBORS ACT OF 1899, § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403.
6THE RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT OF 1899, § 9, 33 U.S.C. § 401.
7

83 8Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, supra note 34 at 105.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT, § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV).

A person suffer-

ing legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial relief

thereof.
3'Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, supra note 34 at 101.
'OId. at 105.
"Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, supra note 11.
"See discussion, supra note 38.
"FEDERAL HIGHWAY ACT, 23 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq.
4Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, supra note 11 at 653.
4"Id. at 661.
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further proceedings ;46 plaintiffs in this case brought an independent
action, without having first participated, except for public hearings, in
47
formal agency review.
The Supreme Court has not directly faced the question of standing
in environmental litigation, but it has considered the problem of standing
in similar contexts: standing was granted to tenant farmers for statutorily created interests 48 and to an injured competitor under the A.P.A.
to challenge action of the Comptroller General.4 9 In these two cases the
court required a showing of injury in fact under the Constitutional requirement for a case or controversy, and in addition, a showing that the
"interest sought to be protected is arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." 0
Thus the court specifies two tests: "injury in fact" and "zone of
interests."51
In another instructive opinion 2 by Warren E. Burger when lie sat
as Justice on the Washington, D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, a plaintiff
radio station challenged renewal of a radio broadcasting license by the
Federal Communications Commission. The present Chief Justice noted:
"There is nothing unusual or novel in granting the consuming public
standing to challenge administrative actions,"''5 and that "we do not
now hold that all the [plaintiffs] have standing to challenge WLBT's
renewal-only that the commission must allow standing to one or more
to assert claims on behalf of the public. 54

"Seenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F.P.C., supra note 11 at 624.
'7Road
Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, supra note 11 at 655.
4
SA.D.P. v. Camp, supra note 10.
9
' Barlow v. Collins, supra note 10.
'A.D.P. v. Camp, supra note 10 at 153.
"Barlow v. Collins, supra note 10 at 164. Dissent to standing treatment in Barlow v.
Collins, supra note 10 at 168. Davis, supra note 1 at 456 argues that the zone of
interests test articulated in Barlow v. Collins would, if applied, have denied standing
to the plaintiff in A.D.P. v. Camp, supra note 10.
'Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., supra note 15;
National Association of Security Dealers v. Securities & Exch. Com'n, 420 F.2d
83 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In the latter case plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin the S.E.C.
from establishing a collective investment fund. In a concurring opinion on standing
Warren E. Burger, J. identified three theories upon which to base standing: statutory,
public license, and statutory protection. He found five "hybrid variations" some
of which are valid, some not: (1) the Flast v. Cohen (supra note 7) provision for
taxpayer challenges of federal expenditures allegedly in violation of specific constitutional limitations; (2) the unique application of the "consumer aggrievement"
concept articulated in Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C.
(supra note 15) pursuant to the ''person aggrieved'' provision of the F.C.A. (Federal
Communications Act) 47 U.S.C. § 309 (d) (1964); (3) the discretionary standing
theory broached in Curran v. Clifford (December 27, 1968), opinion vacated petition

for rehearing en bane granted No. 21,040 (D.C. Cir. April 3, 1969) ; (4) the concept
that ''aggrievement in fact'' is sufficient to give a party standing to challenge
action under Section 10 of the A.P.A., 5 U.S.C. § 702; (5) the improper utilization
of the ''unlawful competition'' theory employed y some courts which have granted
standing in cases involving recent promulgations by the Comptroller of the Currency.
Saxon v. Georgia Assoc. Of Industrial Inc. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968).
'Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., supra note 15 at
1002.
"'Id. at 1006.
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While these statements are in the context of an F.P.C. licensing suit,
already noted as a separate category,15 they are nevertheless indicative
of a position not adverse to granting standing to a representative of the
public interest, and more importantly, they indicate that the critical
problem is not whether the public inerest is to be represented, but who
is to be granted the right to do so, a problem considered below.
Adding this to the environmental cases discussed above, some points
emerge: statutes designed to protect some public interest are being construed to create enforceable non-economic rights.56 The A.P.A. will provide judicial authority to a federal court to review agency action, even
though the agency's enabling legislation lacks a judicial review provision. 57 The question has become "What are the characteristics of a qualified representative of the public interest'?"
Before this question can be answered, it is necessary to examine contrary holdings. What was beginning to appear as an even and unbroken
chain in the development of the law of standing was shaken by a recent
California case. The Ninth Circuit denied standing to the Sierra Club
seeking injunctive relief to prevent development of the Mineral King

Supra note 15.
"Statutes that have been held to create enforceable public rights include, e.g., The
Federal Power Act, supra note 29, and in Citizens for Allegon County, Inc. v. F.P.C.,
414 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Vir. 1969); The 1964 Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 in Parker
v. U.S., 309 F. Supp. 593 (D.Colo. 1970); The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956,
Section 116c, 70 Stat. 385, 23 U.S.C. § 128 in Nashville 1-40 Steering Committee v.
Ellington, 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967); Food and Agriculture Act of 1965, 7 U.S.C.
§ 144 (d) (10) and the Anti-Assignment Act, 31 U.S.C. § 203 in Barlow v. Collins,
supra note 10; Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80 a-42(a) in National
Ass'n of Security Dealers v. S.E.C., supra note 52, and in J. I. Case Co v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964); the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7
U.S.C. § 135b (1964) in E.D.F. v. Hardin, supra note 11; The Anadromous Fish Act
in Udall v. F.P.C., 387 U.S. 428 (1967); The Federal Communications Act, supra
note 15; The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, supra notes 35 and 37; the Interstate
Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 550, 49 U.S.C. § 305(g) in American Trucking Ass'n Inc.
v. U.S., 364 U.S. 1 (1960).
Sax, supra note 5 at 151 lists the following as expressing a governmental policy
of protection: The Federal Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1653 (f) (Supp. IV,
1968); The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1662(a) (1964) ; The
Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 620b, 620g (1964) ; The Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 688aa(b) (Supp. IV, 1968); The Cape Cod National Seashore Act, 16 U.S.C. § 459 b-6(b) (1) (Supp. 1969); The Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1500c (1964); The Everglades Park Act, 16 U.S.C. § 410c, d (1964).
"7Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, supra note 34 at 102. "There can
be no question at this late date that Congress intended by the Administrative Procedure Act to assure comprehensive deview of 'a broad spectrum of administrative
actions,' including those made reviewable by specific statutes without adequate
review provisions as well as those for which no review is available under any other
statute.'' Abbott Labororatories v. Gardner supra note 12; National Ass 'n of Security
Dealers v. S.E.C., supra note 52 at 96; Road Review League, Town of Bedford v.
Boyd, supra note 11 at 661; Powelton Civic Home Owners v. H.U.D., supra note 31
at 820; E.D.F. v. U.S. Dep't of H.E.W. (Health, Education and Welfare), 428 F.2d
1083, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ; S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong. 1st Session 26 (1945);
H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong. 2d Session 41 (1946). Contra, Harrison-Halsted
Community Group v. Housing and Home Finance Admin. Agency, supra note 13 at
104; Kansas City Power and Light v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Dillon, 335 F.2d 292, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Sierra Club v. Hickel,
433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970); Note, Federal Regulations of Air Transportation and
Environmental Impact, 35 UNIV. op Cm. L. REV. 317.
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Valley under licensing decisions of the Department of the Interior. 5
Emphasizing that standing requires injury in fact, though not necessarily
economic, the court found that the Sierra Club, a California non-profit
conservation organization, did not have sufficient interest in the proposed
development to qualify as an injured party.5 9 The court held that the
A.P.A. does not broaden standing 60 and distinguished the cases relied
on by the Sierra Club in support of standing. Scenic Hudson v. F.P.C.1
was distinguished by noting that local plaintiffs had organized and joined
to sue, and that the F.P.A. granted judicial review.6 2 Communication
Office of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C.6 3 was distinguished as
a consumer case.6 4 Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd6 5
and Powelton Civic Ho neowners v. H.U.D.6 6 were brought by plaintiffs
directly affected by the challenged action. 6 7 A.D.P. v. Camp65 was a
case of a plaintiff with an injury in fact, even with the "zone of interests" language.6 9 The court disposed of Citizens Committee for Hudson
Valley v. Volpe 0 in a footnote, disagreeing with the Second Circuit's
holding to the extent that the Sierra Club had standing as a private attorney general.

1

Finally, the court required that there exist:

. . . an element of legal wrong being inflicted upon [the plaintiff]
or that [the plaintiff be] adversely affected by agency action or
aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute.
It is this element which appellee fails to sufficiently allege...
it does not allege that it is aggrieved or that it is adversely af2

fected.

"Sierra Club v. Hickel, supra note 57.
5Id. at 30.
MId. at 32; supra note 57.
Cases cited, supra note 11.
'Sierra Club v. Hickel, supra note 57 at 30.
"See discussion and cases cited, supra note 15.
"Sierra Club v. Hickel, supra note 57 at 30.
6Cases cited, supra note 11.
'Cases cited, supra note 31.
8
Sierra Club v. Ilickel, supra note 57 at 30. The court also distinguished Citizens
Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, supra note 34 and Parker v. U.S., supra note
56 as cases where the Sierra Club was joined by organizations of local plaintiffs.
8'Cases cited, supra note 10.
OSierra Club v. Hickel, supra note 57 at 31. The court submits that the "zone of
interests" language does not constitute a new test.
"Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, supra note 34.
"Sierra Club v. Hickel, supra note 57 at 33, n. 9. ". . . to the extent to which Citizens
Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, indicates that the Sierra Club has standing
within the 'private Attorney Generals' rule, we respectfully disagree. We believe
that rule is limited as it states to cases where Congress has enacted a statute 'conferring on any non-official person, or on a group of non-official persons, authority
to bring a suit' to prevent unauthorized official action. See Scanwell Laboratories,
Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d at 864. We find no indication in any federal statute that
congress has 'conferred' on the Sierra Club or any group like it, authority to bring
suits to challenge official action.'' Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe,
supra note 34 at 103 found that the plaintiffs Sierra Club and Citizens Committee
1"... had evidenced the seriousness of their concern with local natural resources
by organizing for the purpose of cogently expressing it, and the intensity of their
concern is apparent from the considerable expense and effort they have undertaken
in order to protect the public interest . . . In short they have proved the genuineness
of their concern by demonstrating that they are 'willing to shoulder the burdensome
and costly processes of intervention' in an administrative proceeding." (cite omitted)
"Sierra Club v. Hickel, supra note 57 at 32.
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The Sierra Club did allege irreparable harm to the public interest 73
and that "its interest would be vitally affected by the acts hereinafter
described and would be aggrieved by those acts of the defendant as hereinafter more fully appears.' ' 74 The plaintiff alleged that it had 78,000
members nationally, and 27,000 in the San Francisco Bay area, near the
75

Mineral King Valley.

In addition to the footnote confrontation with the Citizens Committee holding7 6 perhaps the most revealing paragraph is this dictum:
We do not believe such club concern without a showing of more direct interest can constitute standing in the legal sense sufficient to
challenge the exercise of responsibilities on behalf of all the citizens by two cabinet level officials of the government acting under
congressional and Constitutional authority.'

Even granting that the Sierra Club did fail to properly allege its
standing, there is nevertheless a posture taken in this case contrary to
78
that of the Second Circuit previously discussed.
What, then, are the characteristics of one who would assert the publice interest? Certain indicia emerge: in most cases, there are local plain-

tiffs, 79 not necessarily private persons suing individually, but groups of

local citizens, who, in a daily and routine way will be affected by the
challenged action. Private persons have also been granted standing to

assert environmental issues, but only where joined with organizations.8 0
Non-profit national organizations granted standing to assert public environmental rights include the Environmental Defense Fund (E.D.F.)
suing as an organization that "seeks to assure the preservation or restoration of environmental quality on behalf of the general public," '
and the Sierra Club as an organization with "a history of involvement
in the preservation of national scenic and recreational resources,' '52 and
as having a "special interest in the conservation and sound maintenance
of the national parks and forests.""

"Id., at 28.
"Id. at 29.

'Id., at 29.
"See discussion and cases cited, supra note 11.
'Sierra Club v. Hickel, supra note 57 at 30.
'RAfter dismissing the case for want of standing, the court went on to discuss the
merits. From that discussion it appears that environmental considerations were .
significant part in the agency's proceedings, but that, of course, ought not to be of
significance in a standing question.
"Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F.P.C., supra note 11; Citizens Committee

for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, supra note 34; E.D.F. v. Hardin, supra note 11; E.D.F.
v. H.E.W., supra note 57. Contra, E.D.F. v. Hoerner-Waldorf, No. 1694 (D. Mont.,
August 25, 1970) note, E.D.F. v. Hoerner Waldorf: Pollution, Industry and Consti1ttional Rights,

infra at 161.

'E.D.F.

v. Hardin, supra note 11; E.D.F. v. H.E.W., supra note 57; Parker v. U.S.,
supra note 56.
8
E.D.F. v. Hoerner-Waldorf, supra note 79.
"Citizens Committee for Hudson River v. Volpe, supra note 34 at 103.
'Sierra Club v. Hickel, supra note 57 at 29.
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Professor Kenneth C. Davis8 4 and David Sive,8 5 esq. suggest that
public interest suits are basically class actions, and that Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure8 6 applies. The Rule 23 requirement that
the representative "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class" is echoed in the discussions of standing. Key language has required that the Plaintiff seeking to assert the public interest in an environment be "a responsible representative, "87 or that he be an "appropriate representative. ''8 Plaintiffs are granted standing as "private
attorney generals. '"89 Language used has required an "organization interest'' 90 in the interest sought to be protected; or an "obvious and acute
concern.' '91
92
In denying standing, the Ninth Circuit sought a "direct interest. ''
The Sixth Circuit, in denying standing to a group of citizens seeking to
protect historic buildings,93 recognized two circumstances conferring
standing where the theory is that of a private attorney general. The court
described the doctrine:
That persons or groups who by their activities and conduct have
exhibited a special interest in areas involved in the suit may be
included as parties aggrieved or adversely affected by agency action .'
Such a doctrine provides standing under two circumstances: when
the plaintiffs are citizens of the area and their direct interests are
affected and where the group seeking to represent the citizens has
been actively engaged in the administrative process and has thereby
shown a special interest in the controversy.'

It is clear from these cases that the plaintiff seeking to represent
the public interest in an environment, must show that he is suited to the
task, by membership, motivation, interest, competence, and conduct; that
he has, does, and will act to protect that interest.9 6 Whether courts ex"'Davis, supra note 5 at 613.
'David Sive, Availability of Injunctive and Declaratory Relief in Private Suits, a
presentation to the Environmental Law Conference, Ann Arbor, Michigan, November
13-14, 1970.
86FED. R. Civ. P. 23:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of
a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class.
'-Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, supra note 34.
8Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., supra note 15 at 1006.
"Associated Industries v. Ickes, supra note 16 at 704.
OOE.D.F. v. Hardin, supra note 11 at 1002.
9
'Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., supra note 15 at
1002.
92
Sierra Club v. Hickel, supra note 57 at 30.
OSouth Hill v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969).
"'Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968);
Powelton Civic Howeowners v. H.U.D., supra note 31.
'Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F.P.C., supra note 11; Road Review League,
Town of Bedford v. Boyd, supra note 11.
"Turlock and Tippy, The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 55 CORNELL L. REv.
723, 726 (1970) suggest that the criteria might involve the "'. . . history of the
group's involvement in environmental problems, the range and depth of its concerns
and activities, and its ability to bring significant new data and alternative proposals
to the attention of the decision maker," citing South Hill v. Romney, supra note 93.
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pressly adopt Rule 23 and class action criteria or not, the cases leave
little doubt that, at bottom, these considerations will constitute the key
to being granted standing to assert the public interest in an environment.
Standing to challenge agency action to protect an environment, then,
has three elements: injury in fact to the interest asserted, a demonstrated
nexus between the interest and the conduct challenged and a demonstrated capacity to represent the interest.
STATUTORY

STANDING TO CHALLENGE PRIVATE CONDUCT

The growing number of cases challenging agency action provide a
marked contrast to a second area of equally vital concern: that of standing to assert the public interest where the conduct challenged is that of
another private person or corporation, and not an agency of government.
The citizen can now sue local government officers." He can challenge local and state government,98 but lie has no access to the acts of
other persons where he can allege no private injury greater than that to
the public, and sues solely to assert the public interest.
Nuisance, private and public, 99 and trespass, 100 are available, but
the severe restrictions on them limit their effectiveness in many jurisdictions. 10 1 The traditional limitations of public nuisance may not be
necessary, or even desirable, but they still exist.102
Another solution is proposed: statutory standing for private citizens
to sue on behalf of the public. l03 A suggested statute is appended, taken
from a Michigan statute on standing, authored by Professor Joseph Sax.
His model is clearly in the tradition of the common law, 10 4 and is close
in form to public nuisance, except for the requirement that a public official bring the suit, and for many jurisdictions, a broader subject matter than presently exists for public nuisance suits.10 5

0Comment, Taxpayer's Suits: A Survey and Summary, supra note 23; Peck, Standing
Requirements for Obtaining Review of Governmental Action in Washington, 35 WASH.
L. Ryv. 362. In Montana: MeClintock v. City of Great Falls, 53 Mont. 221, 163 Pac.

99 (1917); Hill v. Rae, 52 Mont. 378, 158 Pac. 826 (1916); Poe v. Sheridan County,
52 Mont. 279, 157 Pac. 185 (1916); Chumasero v. Potts, 2 Mont. 242 (1876), Sierra
Club v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency and Commission of Conservation, (Cir.

Ct. of Minn., October 3, 1969).
"Articles cited, supra note 23.
"Wilson, Nuisance as a Modern Mode of Land Use Control, 46 WASH. L. REV. 47 (1970).
'®Renken v. Harvey Aluminum (Incorporated), 226 F. Supp. 160 (1963).
1
0'Nelson v. C.C. Plywood, 154 Mont. 414, 465 P.2d 314 (1970).
'02Wilson, supra note 99 at 114.
'0'Thomas J. Anderson, Gordon Rockwell Environmental Protection Act of 1970. Public
Act No. 127, Mich. Stats. Ann. § 14.528(201).
0

'JosEPH L.

10

SAx, DEFENDING

247-48 (1971).
Wilson, supra note 99 at 114.

THE ENVIRONMENT:

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol32/iss1/8

A

STRATEGY

FOR

CITIZEN

ACTION,

12

McCann: Standing: Who Speaks for the Environment?
MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Voh 32

To date Michigan is the only state that has enacted the statute, 1° 6
but it is under consideration in others, l07 and similar measures have been
introduced in the House' 08 and Senate'0 9 of the United States as well.
The necessity of statutory standing is evident from the simple comparison noted between the quantity of cases challenging governmental
action, where standing law is being built, and the area of private conduct, where so little exists upon which to build. As the law grows to meet
the needs of the citizen and the public in protecting an environment, this
step too, must be taken.
The appended statute authorizes suits to challenge conduct allegedly
having an adverse impact on an environment. 110 The court is granted
jurisdiction to hear and decide the issues,"' granting relief as justified
under the circumstances, whether to abate, limit, or find for the defendant. The courts role in this process is the same as in any other: to resolve
conflict by deciding cases brought before it.
In § 2 the Act authorizes three classes of persons to bring suit: the
attorney general, local governments, and private citizens. In § 3 the plaintiff is required to make out a prima facie case, and then the burden is
placed on the defendant either to rebut, or to make an affirmative defense-to demonstrate that his conduct is in the public interest. There
is a provision for a court appointed referee, "disinterested and teehnically qualified" which may be necessary in complex and protracted
cases. " 2 There is also provision for costs and attorney's fees as the court
3
directs.
In § 4 the provisions of the act are integrated into existing administrative procedures, giving the court power to act in emergency situa-

"IEffective date was October 1, 1970.
InSAX, supra note 104 at 247 lists 5 states: New York, Massachusetts, Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee; Note, Legal fethods for Control of Air Pollution in New
York State: An Evaluation, 34 ALBANY L. REv. 563, 565 (1970); New York Times,

February 18, 1970 at 1 col. 4.
-tH.R. 15780, A Bill to Amend the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to
Confer Standing on Private Persons to Sue for Relief from Pollution, 91st Congress,
2d Session. Introduced February 9, 1970 and referred to the Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries; SAX, supra note 104 at 247 cites H.R. 16436, introduced March
10, 1970 by Representative Morris Udall, as a bill modeled after the Michigan law,
supra note 103.
'IS. 3575, The Environmental Policy Act of 1970, Senators Philip Hart and George
McGovern; Proposed amendments to the National Air Quality Act of 1970, S. 4358,
91st Congress, 2d Session, in S. Rep. No. 91-1196, Title III, § 304(a) (1) Citizen
Suits, permit citizens to enforce the act (at 64), but does not provide for a common
law development (at 30), restricting actions to violations of specified standards,
after notification is made to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (at 122).
Trial, Vol. 6, no. 5 at 6 (August/September 1970).
1" lnfra, app. § 2.
lid.
2
0

" Id.

"aInfra, app. § 3. Neither the Michigan law, supra note 103, nor the model law, supra
note 104, allow attorney's fees. H.R. 15780, supra note 108 allows for costs and punitive damages. The National Air Quality Standards Act of 1970, supra note 109,
allows for litigation costs, attorneys fees, and expert witness fees.
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tions, but allowing for full utilization of administrative regulatory pro-

ceedings. 11 4 The court, does, however, retain jurisdiction, pending final
resolution. 115
The Act in § 5 grants to persons with standing under this act authority to intervene in an agency proceeding. 116
The statute does not define its terms. Definitions of environmental
quality, pollution, public interest, public trust,11 7 and natural resources
are left to the process of judicial evolution, to be constructed case by
case, as the needs of justice beween the parties require. The statute does
not provide standards for implementation of its provisions, but also
leaves that to the courts.

118

There are, of course, arguments against the statute: it is not needed;
it will flood the courts; it will subject industry to harrassment from
over-zealous citizens; the courts are not competent to make the required
technical determinations; it will result in piecemeal and patchwork standards, when what is needed is code law, uniform, consistent, and unambiguous; it will shift the decision making process for environmental
control from the executive to the judicial.
Response to these objections is not too difficult. While an increase
in cases can certainly be expected, there is little danger of a flood of
litigation when it is remembered that the courts here, as in all other
areas of litigation, control the gates: they remain competent to screen
the meritorious from the frivolous, the genuine from the vexatious. The
law to be developed will be that applied to situations as they arise, in
an area not presently conducive to codification because of the variables,
the present uncertainties involved, and the overriding need for creative
and innovative decisions. The courts are proving their competence in
cases of judicial review to hear and decide a great variety of complex
environmental issues, not because of their scientific or technical expertise, but because the disputes are of basic and fundamental policy matters, requiring the weighing and balancing of conflicting interests. And
finally, no shift of power can reasonably be expected, since this act, insofar as it affects the administrative function, is operative only when the
administrative agencies have failed, or have allegedly failed, to act.

4

1 Infra,
156Id.

app. § 4.

" Infra, app. § 5. In Montana administrative proceedings and judicial review provisions vary between agencies. The proposed Montana Administrative Procedures
Act (M.A.P.A.) would make proceedings and review uniform in most cases. This
proposed standing statute will conflict with neither, but will provide more opportunities for participation in agency proceedings than presently exist, as will the
proposed M.A.P.A.
nThe Montana Constitution contains the public trust concept: Article XVII. Public
Lands. § 1. All lands of the state that have been or that may hereafter be granted
to the state by congress, and all lands acquired by gift or grant or devise, from
any person or corporation, shall be public lands of the state, and shall be held in
trust for the people . . .
"Infra, app. § 2.
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To put the act in its proper perspective it is important to see it as
a rather modest proposal-as a step, and not a very large one at thattoward providing representation in the courts for a public interest. Even
so, two more serious questions can be raised: Whether the act will be regarded as substantive state law and so controlling in the federal courts?
Whether the standing conferred by the act meets the constitutional requirement for case or controversy?"' And a third possibility exists: that
the courts will recognize suits in environmental protection as class actions, and so provide the needed means to attack private polluters. Consideration of these questions is left for another time.
CONCLUSION
While the last word on standing to challenge federal agency action
has not been spoken, it is clear that the public interest has gained a point
of access to the administrative decision-making process. The need to consider environmental issues, asserted by a party having demonstrated its
capacity to represent the public, is being met where the problem is judicial review of agency action. It is equally clear that the need is not
being met in the area of private conduct affecting the public interest.
Statutory standing designed to provide a forum for the public interest
can meet that need in a responsible, responsive and adaptive mode.
RICHARD E. McCANN

APPENDIX
With only minor changes, this is a copy of the statute enacted in Michigan as
Public Act No. 127, Environmental Protection. The author of this, and a similar model

law, Joseph Sax, describes its purpose as three-fold: "to recognize the public right to
a decent environment as an enforceable legal right; to make it enforceable by private
citizens suing as members of the public; and to set the stage for the development of
a common law of environmental quality.'2

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
An ACT to provide for action for declaratory and equitable relief for protection
of the air, water and other natural resources and the public trust therein; to prescribe
the rights, duties and functions of the attorney general, any political subdivision of
the state, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity;
and to provide for judicial proceedings relative thereto.
Section 1. Short title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Environmental Protection Act. "I
Section 2. Action in District Court; granting of relief.
(1)
The attorney general, any political subdivision of the state, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity may maintain an

u'Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. F.P.C., supra note 11 at 615; E.D.F. v.
Hardin, supra note 11 at 1097; Associated Industries of New York v. Ickes, supra
note 16.
'21SAx, supra note 104 at 247.
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action in the district court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred
or is likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief against the state, any political
subdivision thereof, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or
other legal entity for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources and
the public trust therein from pollution, impairment, or destruction.
(2)
In granting relief provided by subsection (1) where there is involved a
standard for pollution or for an anti-pollution device or procedure, fixed by rule or
otherwise, by an instrumentality or agency of the state or a political subdivision thereof, the court may:
(a) Determine the validity, applicability and reasonableness of the standard.
(b) When a court finds a standard to be deficient, direct the adoption of a
standard approved and specified by the court.
(3)
If the court has reasonable ground to doubt the solvency of the plaintiff or
the plaintiff's ability to pay any cost or judgment which might be rendered against him
in an action brought under this act the court may order the plaintiff to post a surety
bond or cash not to exceed $500.00.
Section 3. Evidentiary showing; principles applicable; master or referee; costs.
(1)
When the plaintiff in the action has made a prima facie showing that the
conduct of the defendant has, or is likely to pollute, impair or destroy the air, water,
or other natural resources or the public trust therein, the defendant may rebut the
prima facie showing by the submission of evidence to the contrary. The defendant
may also show, by way of affirmative defense, that there is no feasible and prudent
alternative to the defendant's conduct and that such conduct is consistent with the
promotion of the public health, safety and welfare in light of the state's paramount
concern for the protection of its natural resources from pollution, impairment or destruction. Except as to the affirmative defense, the principles of burden of proof
and weight of the evidence generally applicable in civil action in the district courts
shall apply to action brought under this act.
(2)
The court may appoint a master or refree, who shall be a disinterested person and technically qualified, to take testimony and make a record and a report of
his findings to the court in the action.
(3)
Costs and reasonable attorney's fees may be apportioned to the parties if
the interests of justice require.
Section 4. Granting of Relief; imposition of conditions.
(1)
The court may grant temporary and permanent equitable relief, or may
impose conditions on the defendant that are required to protect the air, water and
other natural resources or the public trust therein from pollution, impairment, or
destruction.
(2) If administrative, licensing or other proceedings are required or available
to determine the legality of the defendant's conduct, the court may remit the parties
to such proceedings, which proceedings shall be conducted in accord with the provisions
of the applicable statutory requirements. In so remitting the court may grant temporary equitable relief where necessary for the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction. In so remitting the court shall retain jurisdiction of the action
pending completion thereof for the purpose of determining whether adequate protection
from pollution, impairment or destruction has been afforded.
(3)
Upon completion of such proceedings, the court shall adjudicate the impact
of the defendant's conduct on the air, water or other natural resources and on the
public trust therein in accordance with this act. In such adjudication the court may
order that additional evidence be taken to the extent necessary to protect the right
recognized in this act.
(4)
Where, as to any administrative, licensing or other proceeding, judicial review thereof is available, the court originally taking jurisdiction shall maintain jurisdiction for purposes of judicial review.
Section 5. Administrative or other proceedings; intervention; matters for determition; authorization or approval of conduct; collateral estoppel and res judicata.
(1)
Whenever administrative, licensing or other proceedings, and judicial review
thereof are available by law, the agency or the court may permit the attorney general,
any political subdivision of the state, any instrumentality or agency of the state or
of a political subdivision thereof, any persons, partnership, corporation, association,
organization or other legal entity to intervene as a party on the filing of a pleading
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asserting that the proceedings or action for judicial review involves conduct which has,
or which is likely to have, the effect of polluting, impairing or destroying the air,
water or other natural resources or the public trust therein.
(2) In any such administrative, licensing or other proceedings, and in any judicial
review thereof, any alleged pollution, impairment or destruction of the air, water or
other natural resources or the public trust therein, shall be determined, and no conduct
shall be authorized or approved which does, or is likely to have such effect so long as
there is a feasible and prudent alternative consistent with the reasonable requirements
of the public health, safety and welfare.
(3)
The doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata may be applied by the
court to prevent multiplicity of suits.
Section 6. This act shall be supplementary to existing administrative and regulatory procedures provided by law.
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